PAS and the art of borrowed strength

PAS is showing, yet again, how practical and goal-driven it is and how, with each election, it is becoming more than a regional player, nearing its desire to control Putrajaya itself.

Two leaders from PAS’s Batu Pahat division turned up at a Barisan Nasional (BN) event on June 30 in a show of support that left Johor BN chairman Onn Hafiz Ghazi “surprised and touched,” according to an FMT report.

Onn Hafiz embraced the two Batu Pahat PAS committee members, Misran Samian and Hazrin Abdul Hamid, as they were welcomed to the stage.

This obviously follows a directive from PAS headquarters to vote for Umno and BN candidates in the 23 seats where Perikatan Nasional (PN) is not contesting in the Johore state election on July 11.

PAS has not fielded any candidates in Batu Pahat. In fact, it has only fielded 11 candidates for the 56- seat state assembly.

Why is it backing Umno? It expects Umno to again form the next government. If Umno does not have a strong majority, being friendly now could result in Umno joining forces with PAS to form the new state government.

Or, perhaps, the new government may be persuaded, out of gratitude, to nominate someone from PAS to be one of the five unelected assemblymen if it does not win any seat. The Johor state assembly recently passed a state constitutional amendment bill allowing for this and increasing the total number of state representatives to 61.

Let’s remember that PAS got a foothold in Sabah when its state chief Aliakbar Gulasan made it into the state assembly as one of six nominated assemblymen in 2020. Then, in the 2025 election, he stood and won the Karambunai seat.

As part of its strategy, PAS last month formally terminated its federal-level cooperation with Bersatu and shifted its support to Parti Wawasan Negara, the new party launched by former Bersatu deputy president Hamzah Zainudin.

Why? Wawasan has more MPs than Bersatu and, PAS probably thinks, Wawasan leader Hamzah Zainudin would be more malleable than Bersatu’s Muhyiddin Yassin, a former prime minister.

In a hedging approach, PAS said it would continue working with Bersatu assemblymen at the state level in Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu to avoid destabilising those governments.

These moves reflect PAS’s long-standing strategy of using alliances to expand beyond its traditional base in Kelantan and Terengganu. It already has Kedah and Perlis (where it has more assemblymen than Bersatu although Bersatu holds the menteri besar post) and is now spreading its net wider, including in Johor.

For decades, PAS has shown that in Malaysia’s fragmented political landscape, power is rarely won alone. Its history is really a masterclass in tactical alliances — including with rivals and ideological opposites— but always with the same goal of growing its influence.

In 1969, PAS contested independently and won 12 parliamentary seats, a respectable but limited result. Five years later, in 1974, it joined Barisan Nasional and partnered with Umno, its fiercest competitor.

This arrangement lifted PAS to 13 seats and gave it its first taste of federal power. The partnership lasted only until 1977, when PAS was expelled from BN following a crisis in Kelantan. It won just five seats in 1978 and 1982 and one in 1986.

Although short-lived, the experience reinforced a key lesson: coalitions could deliver more than going solo ever had.

That lesson came roaring back in 1990 with Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, a loose pact with Semangat 46. PAS picked up seven seats and briefly shared government in Kelantan.

The real breakthrough came in 1999. PAS joined Barisan Alternatif alongside the secular DAP and the reformist PKR. For an Islamist party committed to an Islamic state, it was a breathtaking gamble. Yet the Reformasi tide carried it to 27 seats and the prize of Terengganu.

Pure pragmatism, wrapped in ideological packaging.

The pattern repeated in 2008 under Pakatan Rakyat. Again, PAS cooperated with DAP and PKR, winning 23 seats and sharing power in Selangor and Penang.

Even in 2013, PAS held 21 seats, proof that coalition politics gave it reach far beyond its rural base. When disputes over hudud law finally broke PR apart in 2015, PAS reverted to smaller experiments like Gagasan Sejahtera, winning 18 seats in 2018. Its performance was enough to hold Kelantan and Terengganu, but far from national prominence.

Then came Perikatan Nasional. Partnering with Bersatu in 2020, PAS rode the wave of political realignment to its greatest triumph. In the 2022 general election, it won 43 seats, becoming the largest single party in Parliament.

For the first time, PAS was not just a regional player but a national heavyweight – and it happened because PAS had mastered the art of borrowed strength.

Now it has dropped Bersatu and is again looking for partners who can help it rise higher; it is betting on Wawasan and Umno to do just this.

PAS has entered and exited several major alliances since the 1970s, including Barisan Nasional, Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, Barisan Alternatif, Pakatan Rakyat, Gagasan Sejahtera, Muafakat Nasional and Perikatan Nasional.

It has worked with rival Umno to consolidate Malay-Muslim unity, with “enemy” DAP to harness urban opposition energy and with Bersatu to ride the anti-establishment wave. Each time it has entered an alliance, PAS has gained seats; when internal disagreements arose, it exited.

This pattern of shifting alliances may appear inconsistent to some observers, with Bersatu describing the split as a betrayal.

PAS, however, seems to see alliances as temporary tools to achieve the goal of Islamic governance rather than as permanent commitments. When circumstances change, PAS withdraws while preserving flexibility for future cooperation – as it is now doing with Umno in Johor.

The party’s strategy is not without setbacks. Early alliances sometimes delivered only modest gains, and periods of isolation, such as in 2018, resulted in seat losses.

Yet the overall trajectory shows that PAS has grown from a regional player to a major national party through strategic partnerships. Alone, it has often been limited to its core bases; with the right allies, it has expanded significantly.

However, it would be unjustified to say PAS is only riding on others’ backs because although coalitions amplify PAS’s seat tally, these coalitions also rely heavily on PAS’ grassroots strength.

In the current environment, with a growing Malay-Muslim population and the rise of political Islam, PAS’s unpredictability in coalition politics is perhaps one of its defining strengths. It can deliver tangible gains but does not promise long-term loyalty.

It speaks the language of religion while playing the game of power with the same ruthlessness as any secular player.

Whether this fluid style of politics will finally carry PAS into Johor — and beyond — remains to be seen.

But one thing is clear. In Malaysia’s shifting terrain, the party that has mastered the art of temporary alliances may well be the one that outlasts them all as it weaves in and out of coalition politics in chasing its dream of making Malaysia an Islamic state.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.